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Abstract 
The literature has focused on a particular way of aggregating judgments: Given a set of yes or no 
questions or issues, the individuals’ judgments are then aggregated separately, issue by issue. 
Applied in this way, the majority method does not guarantee the logical consistency of the set of 
judgments obtained. This fact has been the focus of critiques of the majority method and similar 
procedures. This paper focuses on another way of aggregating judgments. The main difference is 
that aggregation is made en bloc on all the issues at stake. The main consequence is that the 
majority method applied in this way does always guarantee the logical consistency of the 
collective judgments. Since it satisfies a large set of attractive properties, it should provide the 
basis for more positive assessment if applied using the proposed pooling approach than if used 
separately. The paper extends the analysis to the pooling supermajority and plurality rules, with 
similar results. 
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1   Introduction 
The discursive dilemma illustrates two features of the separating judgment 
approach on judgment aggregation (JA) that are useful to consider. First, the 
dilemma illustrates that separating majority voting (and similar judgment 
aggregation procedures such as the separating special majority and the separating 
plurality rules) may lead to a logically inconsistent collective output and therefore 
be unable to guarantee logically consistent collective judgments.
1
 Given that 
logical consistency is deemed a fundamental property of collective judgments, 
this defect of majority voting and of similar judgment aggregation procedures has 
been their most frequently criticized feature and the main cause for the skepticism 
emerging from the separating JA approach about their feasibility as JA 
procedures. 
                                                 
1
 A majority is a subgroup of a group that contains more than half of the entire group. A special 
majority is a group larger than majority. A plurality is a subset having the largest number of 
individuals that may be less than majority. 
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Second, the discursive dilemma also illustrates that such inconsistencies are 
induced by the way the judgment aggregation is carried out under that approach. 
In such a framework, the collective judgments of the group are obtained by 
determining the collective judgment on each of the issues under consideration 
separately as a function of the individual judgments on it. This is the reason why 
we call this way of aggregating judgments ‘separating judgment aggregation.’ It 
differs from determining the collective judgments en bloc based on the 
comprehensive views of the individual group members on all the issues at stake. 
Let us call this latter kind of judgment aggregation ‘pooling judgment 
aggregation.’ 
  
An imaginary example may help to clarify these points. Each year in the city of 
Pamplona there are celebrations for the day of Saint Fermín. The most 
internationally famous element of these celebrations is the bullfighting. With this 
in mind, a civil association known as Politeia called a meeting to propose and 
approve a declaration about such celebrations. They discussed six issues: 
 
1) ‘Bullfights are unjustified torture of the bulls’ (proposition a or, if not, 
proposition ‘not a’) 
2) ‘Every unjustified torture of animals ought to be banned’ (proposition b or,  
if not, proposition ‘not b’);  
3) In particular, ‘Bullfights should be abolished’ (proposition c or, if not, 
proposition ‘not c’);  
4) ‘If they are not abolished, bullfights should be reformed, eliminating the 
cruelest parts’ (proposition d or, if not, proposition ‘not d’);    
5) ‘The broadcasting of bullfights on television should be prohibited’ (proposition 
e or, if not, proposition ‘not e’); 
6) ‘Children should be educated about this problem at school’ (proposition f or,  
if not, proposition ‘not f’). 
 
For simplicity, let us suppose that all members make a judgment on each of the 
six proposed statements. For this, the set of judgments made by each member can 
be represented by means of one of the sixty-four groups of the following form that 
we call complete judgment sets: {a, b, c, d, e, f}, {a, b, c, d, e, not f}, {a, not b, c, 
not d, e, f}, {not a, not b, c, d, not e, f},{not a, not b, not c, not d, not e, not f}, etc. 
 
Let us assume that the individual points of view are represented by the following 
three complete and consistent judgment sets: 
 
Table 1.1 
Judgment sets Support 
{a, b, c, d, e, f} Subgroup A:1/3 of individuals 
{not a, b, not c, d, e, f} Subgroup B:1/3 of individuals 
{a, not b,
 
not c, d, not e, not f} Subgroup C:1/3 of individuals 
 
Under the separating aggregation approach, majority voting is carried out 
separately on each proposition-negation pair. Obviously, proposition a beats ‘not 
a’ because it is accepted by a majority of 2/3 of individuals. It is for the same 
3 
reason that b beats ‘not b’, ‘not c’ beats c, e beats ‘not e’ and f  beats ‘not f,’ 
whereas d beats ‘not d’ because d is unanimously accepted. Thus, the majority 
point of view is represented by the complete judgment set {a, b, not c, d, e, f}.  
 
It should be noted that the judgment set {a, b, not c, d, e, f} is not consistent, 
because propositions a and b together imply proposition c. This instance of the 
discursive dilemma illustrates that majority voting and similar judgment 
aggregation methods do not guarantee consistent collective judgment sets. As 
pointed out above, this flaw is the main reason for the impossibility and 
characterization results on separating judgment aggregation rules, and for the 
unfavorable assessment of majority and special majority rules.
2
  
 
However, majority voting may be used in other ways as well. When groups arrive 
at collective judgments, they commonly use the rule of majority en bloc voting for 
texts dealing with diverse issues. For example, the United Nations Security 
Council frequently proposes resolutions dealing with various issues but approves 
them based on a single vote. When a parliament passes a law, a similar procedure 
is used. The passage of a law depends on a single vote on a larger proposal 
previously elaborated according to statutory procedure. Moreover, the public 
declarations of civil associations, whether scientific or cultural, often address a 
variety of issues. Such a declaration is made public if the group collectively 
passes the proposed text en bloc. Obviously, it would not be difficult to come up 
with many other examples. The point is that aggregating judgments en bloc by 
majority voting is a common way of aggregating judgments in practice.  
  
The aim of this paper is to help to explain this common practice, which, under the 
separating approach to judgment aggregation, may seem paradoxical. In order to 
achieve that aim, I present a more general variant of the usual model of judgment 
aggregation, where judgments may be aggregated en bloc. It turns out that, in 
contrast to the usual separating JA approach, in the model presented in this paper 
the pooling majority rule, the pooling plurality rule, and any pooling special 
majority rule generate consistent collective judgment sets, provided that the 
individual judgment sets are consistent. 
 
Let us refer back to Table 1.1 and take, for instance, the judgment set {b, d, e, f}. 
There is a majority of 2/3 of the individuals who accept it. In addition, since it is a 
subset of the individual judgment sets of subgroups A and B, it is a logically 
consistent judgment set. It is true that the set {b, d, e, f} is not the only judgment 
set accepted by a majority of individuals. The following sets are also accepted by 
a majority: {b, d, e},{b, d, f},{d, e, f}, {a, d}, {b, d},{b, e},{b, f}, {not c, d}, {d, 
e}, {d, f}, {a}, {b}, {not c}, {d}, {e} and { f}. The important thing is that all of 
these majority sets are logically consistent.  
 
                                                 
2
 As Dietrich and List (2008: 1-2) point out: ‘From subsequent impossibility results we know that 
majority voting is not alone in its failure to ensure rational collective judgments on interconnected 
propositions, where rationality is understood as the conjunction of two requirements [consistency 
and completeness]…The generic finding is that dictatorships are the only proposition-wise 
aggregation functions generating consistent and complete judgments and satisfying some minimal 
conditions…This finding is broadly analogous to Arrow’s theorem for preference aggregation.’ 
For an overview of the main standard impossibility and characterization results, see List and Puppe 
(2009) or List (2009). 
4 
The example illustrates another feature of pooling judgment aggregation. Given 
the individual judgments assumed in Table 1.1, no complete judgment set 
achieves a majority and it would seem that the Politeia association cannot make 
public any declaration. Usually in such cases, groups seek a majority declaration 
even if this may not express a collective judgment on each of the issues at stake 
but a collective point of view on a smaller set of issues. For instance, the 
judgment set {b, d, e, f} may be the collective judgment set chosen to represent 
the majority point of view of the assembly. The point here is that a choice takes 
place. The choice is necessary because, in such cases, pooling judgment 
aggregation rules generate more than one majority judgment set.  
 
This feature of pooling judgment aggregation leads to a different view of the 
aggregation process and, consequently, to a different interpretation of the 
judgment aggregation model. In cases such as the Politeia association example, 
the whole process begins by aggregating from the individual points of view and 
ends with the choice of a majority judgment that is to be made public.
3
 I propose 
to deal with such processes by describing them as consisting of two parts or 
stages. In the first stage, the group carries out the aggregation process, usually by 
obtaining several collective judgment sets. In the second stage, the group has to 
choose the judgment set that best expresses the group’s point of view. 
 
It is important to note that this choice may be far from obvious. For instance, 
some collective judgment sets may include judgments on a larger set of 
propositions, whereas others may be supported by more individuals. In addition, 
some judgments may be considered more important than others. This may be the 
case for judgments on propositions a, b, c, and d in our example. Furthermore, the 
decision may depend on the group and the context at hand, and if the decision has 
to be made collectively, it may face the well-known difficulties exemplified by 
the voting paradox. 
 
In any case, it should be kept in mind that the model of pooling judgment 
aggregation presented below does not cover the choice stage. The model covers 
only the first stage, in which the judgment aggregation is carried out.
 4
  
                                                 
3
 In other situations, there may be no need of choosing one judgment set for expressing the group’s 
point of view. Imagine, for example, that the directors of the Politeia association want merely to 
know whether the members of the association have a definite collective point of view on all of the 
points at stake, or only on some of them. 
4
 Under the separating JA approach, there is no choice between a multiplicity of collective 
judgment sets because a judgment aggregation rule is defined in such a way that, in any situation, 
it generates only one collective judgment set (that may be not complete and may be empty). 
Observe, however, that although the problem is not explicitly posed, this does not mean 
that it is completely non-existent. The separating way of using the majority rule in the Politeia 
association example gives the complete set {a, b, not c, d, e, f} as the collective point of view. 
However, each subset of {a, b, not c, d, e, f} also receives the support of a majority, as, for 
example, the subset {a, b, d, e, f} or {a, b, d, f}. As neither of these two subsets presents any 
inconsistency, the question of what the ultimate reason is for the group having to choose the 
inconsistent group {a, b, not c, d, e, f} as the collective point of view instead of {a, b, d, e, f} or 
{a, b, d, f} is raised. In this case, {a, b, not c, d, e, f} has the advantage of being complete, but at 
the same time it is inconsistent, which works against it. In addition, at the time of choosing 
between judgment sets it should not always be a mandatory criterion that they encompass a set 
addressing a larger set of issues. There may be cases in which consistency or the degree of support 
are preferable criteria. 
On the other hand, this does not depend on the appearance of inconsistencies. Imagine 
that the percentages of persons supporting each judgment set vary in the following manner: fifty-
5 
 
I pointed out above that a salient feature of judgment aggregation illustrated by 
the Politeia association example is that there may be no collective judgment set 
that addresses all the points at issue. When this is the case, the usual requirement 
of full (logical) rationality is violated. Usually full rationality is conceived as the 
conjunction of logical consistency and completeness; in other words, a fully 
rational judgment aggregation procedure has to generate without fail a consistent 
collective judgment set that, in addition, addresses all of the issues at stake.  
 
However, the requirement of completeness has been declining in importance 
compared to that of consistency. While it is true that in some kinds of situations 
completeness may be a compelling requirement, this is not always the case. As 
noted by Dietrich and List (2008), dropping the completeness requirement at the 
collective level is a frequently used means of avoiding the impossibility results 
obtained under the standard approach. Gärdenfors (2008) openly criticizes 
completeness as an unnatural requirement (see also García-Bermejo 2011). 
Dietrich and List (2007b and 2008) and Dokow and Holzman (2008) also 
investigate the consequences of eliminating the completeness requirement.
5
 In a 
similar vein, the second section of this paper addresses the question of what 
logical consistency conditions may be reasonably required of pooling judgment 
aggregation procedures, setting aside the completeness restriction. I consider both 
consistency and completeness requirements in a later section (Section 4). 
 
In Section 2, I introduce the model of pooling judgment aggregation, and show 
that pooling majority voting and a large class of similar judgment aggregation 
procedures satisfy relevant requirements of consistency. 
 
In Section 3, I characterize pooling majority voting and pooling special majority 
rules. The section leads to a conclusion that appears to oppose those emerging 
from the separating JA framework on the feasibility of majority voting and special 
majority rules.  
 
Section 4 addresses the question of what happens when the pooling JA rules are 
required to provide a complete collective output in addition to consistency. After 
some preliminary considerations, the section focuses on a weaker variant of the 
pooling plurality rule. Given that this rule always leads to a complete and 
consistent collective output, I show that the presented variant of the pooling 
plurality rule is the only one that satisfies not only the requirement of consistency 
                                                                                                                                     
one percent of the group members support the judgment set {a, b, c, d, e, f}, twenty-nine of them 
support the judgment set {a, b, c, d, e, not f}, and the remaining twenty percent support the 
judgment set {not a, b, not c, d, not e, not f}. In such a case, the complete judgment group which 
achieves a majority is {a, b, c, d, e, f}, with 51% of votes. Nonetheless, by eliminating the 
judgments on the proposition f we obtain the judgment set {a, b, c, d, e}, which achieves 80% of 
votes. I think that we cannot assume that any group will choose and make public the set {a, b, c, d, 
e, f} and not {a, b, c, d, e}. 
These imaginary cases suggest that although judgments are aggregated separately, the 
problem of choosing a judgment set representative of the point of view of a collective persists, in 
spite of the fact that it is not mentioned in the separating JA approach. 
5
 Dietrich and List (2007a) investigate necessary and sufficient conditions under which quota rules 
satisfy each of the requirements for full rationality (completeness, weak consistency, strong 
consistency, and deductive closure).  
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and completeness but also a relevant set of appealing properties. In addition, a 
similar characterization of the plurality rule is also provided.   
 
 
2 A pooling approach to judgment aggregation 
A judgment aggregation procedure generates collective judgments on the basis of 
the judgments made by the individuals in a group. Let N={1, 2,.., n} be a group of 
two or more persons.  
2.1 Basic notations 
For the sake of simplicity, let us adopt standard propositional logic as the logical 
framework (for a more general logical framework, see Dietrich 2007). 
Specifically, the propositions in the agenda are represented in a language L which 
contains (a) a given set of atomic propositions a, b, c, . . .  , and (b) compound 
propositions with the logical connectives : (not), (and),  (or),  (if, then),  
 (if and only if). Formally, L is the smallest set such that a, b, c, . . . L and  
if p, q L, then p, (p q), (p q), (p q), (p q) L. 
 
In this logical framework, a truth-value assignment is a function assigning the 
value  ‘true’ or ‘false’ (or ‘0’ and ‘1’ respectively) to each proposition in L in the 
standard way. A set of propositions S  L (a proposition p L) (a) is logically 
consistent if there exists a truth-value assignment for which all the propositions in 
S are true (for which p is true); (b) is logically inconsistent otherwise;  
(c) S (proposition p) logically entails set S’ (proposition q) if for all truth-value 
assignments for which all the propositions in S are true (for which proposition p is 
true), all propositions in S’ are also true (q is also true); and (d) set S and set S’ 
(proposition p and proposition q) are logically equivalent if each of them logically 
entails the other.  
 
The agenda X is a finite non-empty subset X  L consisting of non-negated 
propositions and their negations. For the sake of simplicity, let us assume also that 
the agenda does not contain any twice-negated propositions (i.e., if a non-negated 
proposition p is in the agenda, then p X). Let us call p the complementary 
proposition of p, and p the complementary proposition of p, where p =  p 
if p is not itself a negated proposition, and p =q if p is the negated proposition 
q. Let us suppose that the agenda X contains two or more propositions p and q 
such that p is not equivalent to q and is not equivalent to q. Otherwise, the 
pooling approach cannot be distinguished from the separating one. 
 
A sub-agenda Y X is any non-empty subset of the agenda consisting, like the 
agenda, of proposition-negation pairs p, p. Notice that the agenda is also a sub-
agenda. Given a sub-agenda Y, let Q
Y
 denote the set of all of the judgment sets A 
such that (a) if p A, then p Y, and (b) if q Y, then either q A or q A, or both. 
Note that Q
Y
 is an exhaustive set of sets that exclude each other, i.e.,  
(1) is a tautology, where q
A
= p Ap, and (2) for any A, A’ Q
Y
, the set 
{A, A’} is logically inconsistent. In addition, let QA denote QY when A QY. 
A
QA
qX
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The judgments that are made by individuals and by the group are represented by 
judgment sets. An individual or collective judgment set is a (possibly empty) 
subset of the agenda A X.  
 
A judgment set A is complete if there is no proposition p such that p A and  
p A; it is weakly consistent if, for any sub-agenda Y, the set A Y is a singleton; it 
is strongly consistent if it is logically consistent, that is, if there exists a truth-
value assignment that assigns ‘true’ to each q A; it is deductively closed if, for 
every proposition p that is (logically) entailed by A, p A; and it is fully consistent 
if it is strongly consistent and deductively closed. 
 
Notice that if a judgment set A is weakly consistent and deductively closed, then it 
is strongly consistent. Conversely, if A is strongly consistent and complete, then it 
is weakly consistent and deductively closed. However, a judgment set A may be 
deductively closed and inconsistent (for instance, the set {p, p, (p q), q, q}).  
 
It is usually assumed that individuals make judgments on every proposition in the 
agenda and that, in addition, those judgments are consistent with each other. Thus, 
individual points of view are represented by complete and fully consistent 
judgment sets, and a profile of individual judgment sets is an n-tuple (A1,…, An) 
of complete and fully consistent judgment sets, where Ai is the judgment set of 
individual i. The universal domain is the set of all the profiles of complete and 
fully consistent judgment sets.  
2.2 Aggregating judgments en bloc 
Let us introduce the model proposed for pooling JA. It differs from the separating 
JA approach in three main respects. First, whereas the input of an aggregation 
process in the pooling framework is, as in the separating case, a profile of 
individual judgment sets, the output is no longer a collective judgment set but a 
set of non-empty (collective) judgment sets. In consequence, aggregation 
procedures need to be represented by aggregation rules of a different kind.  
 
Second, the majority method and similar aggregation procedures are used in a 
different way. Under the separating JA approach, these methods are applied 
separately to any proposition in the agenda, whereas in the pooling JA framework, 
they are applied to sets of such propositions. 
 
Finally, the judgment aggregation stage may be complemented by an additional 
choice stage in which one (or several) of the collective judgment sets returned by 
the aggregation process should be chosen. However, this paper does not analyze 
the second stage, in which the familiar difficulties of preference aggregation may 
arise. The paper is confined to the first stage where judgment aggregation itself is 
carried out.  
 
Take a set of non-empty judgment sets, J. Since the output of any en bloc 
aggregation process is any of such sets of non-empty judgment sets, let us 
consider their main properties. 
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As with other properties below, completeness can be understood in two ways. It 
may be imposed globally on the whole set of judgment sets J, or it may be 
required independently from the judgment sets within J. Let us say that a set of 
judgment sets J is union-wise complete iff A JA is complete; that J is element-
wise complete iff there is a complete A J; and that J is contextually complete iff 
for any sub-agenda Y, Y J≠ . 
 
Notice that if a set of judgment sets J is contextually complete then it is element-
wise complete, and if J is element-wise complete, then it is union-wise complete. 
The converse statements do not hold. Notice, in particular, that J may be union-
wise complete while it is not element-wise complete. 
 
In the pooling JA framework, completeness may demand too much. In any case, it 
requires significantly more than completeness in the separating JA approach. We 
will cover these issues below later. Let us now focus on the consistency 
conditions.  
 
A set of judgment sets J is union-wise weakly consistent iff A JA is weakly 
consistent; J is element-wise weakly consistent iff any A J is weakly consistent.  
 
A set of judgment sets J is union-wise strongly consistent iff A JA is strongly 
consistent, and J is element-wise strongly consistent iff any A J is strongly 
consistent. Obviously, union-wise strong consistency implies element-wise strong 
consistency and union-wise weak consistency. In addition, element-wise strong 
consistency implies element-wise weak consistency. 
 
Notice that demanding deductive closure from any judgment set in J may be too 
strong a requirement because for some sub-agendas Y the judgment sets in Q
Y
 
cannot meet such a demand. Therefore, we can demand from any judgment set A 
in J that if A implies another judgment set A’ such that A logically entails A’, then 
A’ J. But this condition is equivalent to requiring that A JA is deductively 
closed. So, let us say that a set of judgment sets J is deductively closed iff A JA 
is deductively closed. In addition, let us say that J is upper deductively closed, if, 
for any A J and any A’ X such that A logically entails A”, A A’ J; and that J is 
lower deductively closed if, for any A J and any A” X such that A” A, A” J. 
Obviously, if J is deductively closed, then it is upper and lower deductively 
closed. 
 
It should be noted that for any set of judgment sets J, 
(1) if J is union-wise (set-wise) weakly consistent and deductively closed, then it 
is union-wise (set-wise) strongly consistent; 
(2) if J is union-wise complete and union-wise strongly consistent, then it is 
deductively closed.  
 
Let us call a set of judgment sets J union-wise fully consistent iff it is union-wise 
strongly consistent and deductively closed; and let us call J element-wise fully 
consistent iff it is element-wise strongly consistent, and deductively closed. 
 
The key element of the new model offered in this paper is the concept of JA 
correspondence (JAC). A JAC may be pooling or separating. 
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A JA correspondence C is a function that assigns to each profile (A1,…, An) in its 
domain a set of non-empty judgment sets C(A1,…, An).  
 
A separating JA correspondence C is a JAC such that for any profile (A1,…, An) 
in its domain, A C(A1,…, An) is a singleton, i.e., for any A C(A1,…, An) there 
exists in the agenda a proposition p such that {p}=A. 
 
A pooling JA correspondence is a non-separating JAC.  
 
A separating JA method returns a separate collective judgment on each 
proposition of the agenda. It may or may not aggregate independently from the 
judgments on other propositions. If it does, the corresponding separating JAC 
satisfies the following independence property. 
 
Proposition-wise independence. For any proposition p X and any profiles  
(A1,…, An), (A*1,…, A*n) in the domain of C,  
if N{p}=N*{p}, then, {p} C(A1,…, An) iff {p} C(A*1,…, A*n),  
where N{p}={i N: {p} Ai}. 
 
Let us say that a separating JAC is a proposition-wise JAC if it satisfies that 
independence property.  
 
Analogously, a pooling JAC may or may not satisfy the following set-wise 
independence property. If it does, let us say that it is a set-wise JAC.   
 
Set-wise independence. For any judgment set A X and any profiles (A1,…, An), 
(A*1,…, A*n) in the domain of C,  
if NA=N*A, then, A C(A1,…, An) iff A C(A*1,…, A*n), where NA={i N: A Ai}. 
 
The JAC concepts introduced above allow us to define the majority method and 
similar JA aggregation procedures in a way that changes with respect to the 
separating JA framework. The (universal) pooling majority correspondence is the 
function SM that for any profile (A1,…, An) in the universal domain, SM(A1,…, 
An)={A X: NA  (n+1)/2 }, where x  denotes the smallest integer greater than 
or equal to x.  
 
Likewise, given an integer  with n > (n+1)/2 , the (universal) pooling -
special majority correspondence is the function SM  such that
 
for any profile 
(A1,…, An) in the universal domain, SM (A1,…, An)={A X: NA }. And the 
(universal) pooling plurality correspondence is the function SL that for any 
profile (A1,…, An) in the universal domain, SL(A1,…, An)={A X: NA > NA’ for 
any A’ QA}.  
 
It should be noted that in this paper, majority, special majority, and plurality rules 
are defined as universal pooling correspondence rules, that is, as JACs with the 
universal domain. Notice in addition that, in contrast to the pooling plurality 
correspondence, the pooling majority correspondence and any pooling -special 
majority correspondence satisfy set-wise independence. Thus, they are set-wise 
JACs.  
10 
 
On the other hand, the (universal) separating majority correspondence is the 
function PM that for any profile (A1,…, An) in the universal domain,  
PM(A1,…, An)={{p} X: Np  (n+1)/2 }, where Np={i N:{p} Ai}. 
 
Analogously, given an integer  with n > (n+1)/2 , the (universal) separating 
-special majority correspondence is the function PM  that for any profile  
(A1,…, An) in the universal domain, PM (A1,…, An)={{p} X: Np }. And the 
(universal) separating plurality correspondence is the function PL that for any 
profile (A1,…, An) in the universal domain, PL(A1,…, An)={{p} X: Np > N p }. 
 
As in the pooling case and in contrast to the separating plurality correspondence, 
since the separating majority correspondence and any separating -special 
majority correspondence satisfy proposition-wise independence, they are then 
proposition-wise JACs.  
 
For simplicity, let us say that a JAC is union-wise complete, element-wise 
complete, contextually  complete, etc. iff for any profile (A1,.., An) in its domain, 
the set of judgment sets C(A1,…, An) is union-wise complete, element-wise 
complete, set-wise strongly complete, etc., respectively. 
 
It can be easily verified that a pooling majority JAC for an agenda X and any 
group N is union-wise complete (union-wise weakly consistent, union-wise 
strongly consistent, deductively closed) iff the separating majority JAC for the 
agenda X and the group N is union-wise complete (union-wise weakly consistent, 
union-wise strongly consistent, deductively closed).
6
 
2.3 The consistency question 
The introduction of pooling JACs raises the question of which rationality 
conditions may be reasonably imposed on these aggregation rules. 
 
As pointed out in Section 1, completeness is no longer universally recognized in 
the literature as an unconditionally binding requirement in every situation. 
Additionally, element-wise completeness is an ever more demanding restriction, 
as we will see below. For these reasons, I consider the aforementioned question in 
two ways. First, I discuss which consistency restrictions can be reasonably 
imposed on the JACs, leaving aside completeness, and afterwards in Section 4, I 
consider both sets of restrictions.  
 
In contrast to completeness, logical consistency is generally considered an 
unconditionally binding requirement. Since I have mentioned several consistency 
conditions, the question is which ones have to be met unconditionally.   
 
                                                 
6
 By definition, {p} SM(A1,…, An) iff {p} PM(A1,…, An), {p} SM (A1,…, An) iff 
{p} PM (A1,…, An). Then = , and 
= . In addition, if A SM(A1,…, An) and p A, then 
{p} SM(A1,…, An). If {p} SM(A1,…, An), then there is not any A’ SM(A1,…, An) such that 
p A’. Thus, = . Analogously, = 
= . Therefore, = , and 
= .  
11 
In cases like the example of the Politeia association, the desired outcome in 
aggregating judgments en bloc is to obtain a collective judgment set that can 
adequately express the collective point of view of the group. If the aggregation 
stage generates more than one collective judgment set, the objective of the choice 
stage is to choose one of them. It therefore seems that there are three particularly 
desirable conditions on the collective set of judgment sets J resulting from the 
aggregation stage: 1) that J is element-wise strongly consistent; 2) that J is union-
wise weakly consistent, in order to avoid collective ambiguities or collective 
contradictions with regard to any sub-agenda; 3) and that J is deductively closed, 
that is, if a judgment set A is accepted and it implies another judgment set A’, then 
this latter judgment set should be also accepted. In short, J should be union-wise 
weakly consistent and element-wise fully consistent. 
 
It is true that an element-wise fully consistent JAC may not be union-wise fully 
consistent. However, in cases like those depicted by our model, the final aim of 
the whole process is not to choose a set of judgment sets, but to choose one 
collective judgment set. This is why I maintain that in such cases, union-wise full 
consistency is a less urgent requirement than element-wise full consistency.  
 
It turns out that in the pooling JA framework, a large class of JACs satisfy 
element-wise strong consistency, namely the class of all the JA correspondences C 
such that if A C(A1,.., An), then A Aj for some individual j. In particular, and by 
contrast with the separating JA approach, the pooling majority and any pooling 
special majority correspondence satisfy element-wise strong consistency, element-
wise and union-wise weak consistency, and deductive closure, as demonstrated by 
the following straightforward result. All this contrasts with the logical flaws that 
are usually emphasized in regard to the majority method under the separating JA 
approach. In addition, the pooling plurality correspondence also satisfies also 
element-wise strong consistency and element-wise and union-wise weak 
consistency. However, as far as deductive closure is concerned, it only satisfies 
upper deductive closure.
7
 
 
Theorem 2.1.  
(a) The pooling majority correspondence, any pooling special majority 
correspondence, and the pooling plurality correspondence are 
(1) union-wise weakly consistent and, therefore, union-wise and element-wise 
weakly consistent, 
(2) element-wise strongly consistent, 
(3) and upper deductively closed. 
(4) In addition, the pooling majority correspondence and any pooling special 
majority 
correspondence are pooling deductively closed. They are, therefore, element-wise 
fully consistent. 
 
Proof of Theorem 2.1. 
                                                 
7
 Imagine that, in a group with seven members, the judgment set {p, q, r} is supported by three 
individuals, the judgment set {p, q, r} is supported by two individuals, and the judgment set {p, 
q, r} is supported by the remaining two individuals. Then, in respect to the sub-agenda {p, , r, 
r}, the judgment set {p, r} is supported by three individuals while the judgment set {p, r} is 
supported by four individuals. Thus, lower deductive closure is violated. 
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Let C be the pooling majority correspondence, or some pooling special majority 
or the pooling plurality rule, and let A C(A1,.., An) for any given profile (A1,.., 
An). Then NA > NA’  for every A’ Q
A
. Hence, C is union-wise weakly 
consistent. In addition, there is an individual j such that A Aj. Thus, A is strongly 
consistent because Ai is strongly consistent. In regard to part 3, imagine that A 
implies A’. Then NA NA A’, and therefore, NA A’ NA . In addition, for any 
A* Q
A A’
 and any Aº Q
A
, such that Aº Q, NAº NA* . 
Thus, NA A’ NA > NAº NA* . Therefore, NA A’ > NA*  for any A* Q
A A’
 
and A A’ C(A1,.., An). With regard to part 4, notice that if A implies A’, then 
NA NA’ and NA’ NA . Hence, if A SM( A1,.., An) then A’ SM(A1,.., An), and if 
A SM ( A1,.., An), then A’ SM ( A1,.., An). QED. 
 
3 Characterization of the pooling majority and 
special majority correspondences 
May’s famous theorem states that the only one universal and decisive preference 
aggregation function that is anonymous, neutral, and positively responsive is the 
(binary or Condorcet’s variant of the) majority method (May 1952).8 In regard to 
JA, Dietrich and List’s (2010b) Theorem 1 states that if the separating aggregation 
method is consistent, anonymous, and acceptance/rejection-neutral (a property 
close to systematicity) on a somehow restricted domain, then it is the separating 
majority method (restricted to that domain). In addition, it can easily be shown 
that the separating majority rule satisfies many other desirable properties. 
However, it is also known that if the agenda is not extremely simplified, then the 
separating majority rule fails to meet union-wise full consistency for some 
profiles of individual judgment sets, as the discursive dilemma illustrates (see List 
and Puppe 2009). This failure has been the main focus of critique lodged against 
the majority method in the JA literature. 
 
In contrast, I have shown that the pooling majority correspondence is union-wise 
weakly consistent and element-wise fully consistent. Moreover, I have argued that 
in situations like that depicted by our model, element-wise fully consistency is 
more binding than union-wise strong consistency. Thus, the following question 
arises: Can the pooling majority correspondence be characterized similarly to that 
of May or to that of Dietrich and List? Can it be shown that pooling majority 
correspondence also satisfies a large set of desirable properties? If this is the case, 
then the majority method should be acknowledged as a feasible and relevant JA 
method for aggregating judgments en bloc. This assessment runs contrary to the 
usual assessment of the separating majority rule.  
 
Theorem 3.1 below is a variant of May’s theorem.9 It not only states that the 
pooling majority correspondence satisfies some variants of the properties 
mentioned above in regard to May’s theorem; it also states that the pooling 
majority correspondence is the only one that satisfies them. Consider the 
following properties: 
                                                 
8
 May calls the preference aggregation functions ‘group decision functions.’ 
9
 I follow May’s approach instead of that of Dietrich and List because, while the latter leads to 
restricting the domain of the majority rule, the former allows us to exploit the fact that this rule is 
element-wise fully consistent in the whole universal domain.  
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Proposition-wise anonymity. For any proposition p X and any profiles 
(A1,…,An), (A*1,…, A*n) in the domain of C that are permutations of each other,  
{p} C(A1,…, An) iff {p} C(A*1,…, A*n). 
 
Set-wise systematicity. For any judgment sets A, A’ X and any profiles (A1,…, 
An), (A*1,…, A*n) in the domain of C,  
if NA=N*A’, then, A C(A1,…, An) iff A’ C(A*1,…, A*n).
10
 
 
Notice that set-wise systematicity is a rather strong property because it states that 
sets that may be completely different in all respects and therefore different in size 
be treated the same if the subgroup of persons that support each of them is the 
same. It echoes the neutrality condition in social choice theory in the sense that 
any two pairs of 
social states that are treated the same way by each individual should be treated the 
same way socially, independently of any other consideration. This feature lies at 
the heart of Sen’s position against welfarism. In the next section, I introduce a 
weaker property, namely, that of contextual set-wise systematicity. However, the 
point here is that the pooling majority correspondence is set-wise systematic.    
 
Proposition-wise positive responsiveness.  Any JA correspondence C is 
proposition-wise positively responsive, iff for any p X and any profiles  
(A1,…, An), (A*1,…, A*n) in its domain, if Np N*p and, in addition, {p} C(A1,…, 
An) or { p} C(A1,…, An),  
then {p} C(A*1,…, A*n) and { p} C(A*1,…, A*n). 
 
Theorem 3.1 Let C be any universal JAC. C satisfies union-wise weak 
consistency, proposition-wise anonymity, set-wise systematicity, and proposition-
wise positive responsiveness, iff C is the pooling majority correspondence, that is, 
for any profile (A1,…, An) and any judgment set A X, A C(A1,…, An) iff NA  
(n+1)/2 . 
 
Proof of Theorem 3.1. The ‘then, if’ part is straightforward. Therefore, let us 
focus on the ‘if, then’ part. Notice that by universality and set-wise systematicity, 
the statement ‘for any profile (A1,…, An) and any proposition p, {p} C(A1,…, An) 
iff N{p}  (n+1)/2 ’ implies that for any profile (A1,…, An) and any judgment set 
A X, A C(A1,…, An) iff NA  (n+1)/2 . To verify this, let (A*1,…, A*n) be 
any profile in the domain of C such that for some proposition p X, 
NA = N*{p} . By universality, there are such profiles in the domain of C. 
Imagine that the statement  
‘{p} C(A*1,…, A*n) iff N{p}  (n+1)/2 ’ holds. Given that NA = N*{p} , 
systematicity implies then that A C(A1,…, An) iff NA  (n+1)/2 . 
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 Obviously, set-wise systematicity implies proposition-wise systematicity: 
Proposition-wise systematicity. For any p, q X and any profiles (A1,…, An), (A*1,…, A*n) in the 
domain of C, if N{p}=N*{q}, then, {p} C(A1,…, An) iff {q} C(A*1,…, A*n). 
Instead of proposition-wise systematicity, Dietrich and List (2010a) use the weaker 
property of unbiadness: 
Proposition-wise unbiasedness. For any profiles (A1,…, An), (A*1,…, A*n) in the domain of F and 
any proposition p X, if Np=N* p, then, {p} C(A1,.., An) iff { p} C(A*1,.., A*n). 
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Thus, to prove the theorem, it suffices to prove that for any profile (A1,…, An) and 
any proposition p, {p} C(A1,…, An) iff N{p}  (n+1)/2 . This is done in Claim 
5. 
 
Claim 1. If N{p} = N{ p } , then, {p} C(A1,…, An) and { p} C(A1,…, An). 
Proof of Claim 1. If N{p} = N{ p } , then set-wise systematicity implies that 
{p} C(A1,…, An) iff { p} C(A1,…, An). Thus, by union-wise weak consistency, 
{p} C(A1,…, An) and { p} C(A1,…, An). QED. 
 
Claim 2. If N{p} > N{ p } , then {p} C(A1,…, An). 
Proof of Claim 3. Take from the universal domain a profile (A’1,…, A’n) such that 
N’{p}=N’{ p } and N’{p} N{p}. By Claim 1, {p} C(A’1,…, A’n) and 
{ p} C(A’1,…, A’n). Then by proposition-wise positive responsiveness, 
{p} C(A1,…, An). QED. 
 
Claim 3. If N{p} > N{ p } , then { p} C(A1,…, An). 
Proof of Claim 3. Assume that N{p} > N{ p }  and { p} C(A1,…, An) for a proof 
by contradiction. Take from the universal domain a profile (A’1,…, A’n) such that 
N{p}=N’{ p } and N{ p }=N’{p}. Notice that by set-wise systematicity, {p}  
C(A’1,…, A’n). Take now another profile (A”1,…, A”n) from the universal domain 
such that N”{p} = N’{p} , N”{p}  N{p}, N{ p } N”{ p }. Notice that the profile 
(A”1,…, A”n) is a permutation of the profile (A’1,…, A’n). Therefore, by 
anonymity {p} C(A”1,…, A”n). Then, given that N”{p}  N{p}, proposition-wise 
positive responsiveness implies that {p} C(A1,…, An) and { p} C(A1,…, An), 
contradicting the assumption that { p} C(A1,…, An). QED. 
 
Claim 4. {p} C(A1,…, An) and { p} C(A1,…, An), iff N{p} > N{ p} . 
Proof of Claim 4. Notice that according to Claim 2 and 3, if N{p} > N p , then 
{p} C(A1,…, An) and { p} C(A1,…, An). Let us prove, then, that if 
{p} C(A1,…, An) and { p} C(A1,…, An), then N{p} > N{ p} . Also by Claims 2 
and 3, if N{ p} > N{p} , then {p} C(A1,…,An) and { p} C(A1,…, An). 
According to Claim 1, if N{p} = N p , then {p} C(A1,…, An) and 
{ p} C(A1,…, An). Therefore, if {p} C(A1,…, An) and { p} C(A1,…, An), then 
N{p} > N p . Hence, {p} C(A1,…, An) and { p} C(A1,…,An), iff 
N{p} > N p . Q.E.D. 
 
Claim 5. For any profile (A1,…, An) and any proposition p, {p} C(A1,…, An) iff 
N{p}  (n+1)/2 . 
Proof of Claim 5. By union-wise weak consistency and Claim 4, if {p} C(A1,…, 
An), then N{p}  (n+1)/2 . On the other hand, Claim 3 implies that if N{p}  
(n+1)/2  then {p} C(A1,…, An). QED. 
 
A parallel result, namely Theorem 3.2, can be proven for any -special majority 
correspondence by using an analogous argument. In this case, proposition 
threshold need and proposition-wise -positive responsiveness are understood in 
the following way. 
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Proposition-wise threshold need. Let C be a JAC and let  be an integer such that 
n > (n+1)/2 . Let us say that C needs the threshold  if for any proposition p X 
and any profile (A1,.., An) in the domain of C, if {p} C(A1,.., An) then Np . 
 
Proposition-wise -positive responsiveness. Any JA correspondence C is 
proposition-wise -positively responsive iff for any proposition p X and any 
profiles (A1,.., An), (A*1,…, A*n) in the domain of C,  
(1) if  N{p} N*{p} and {p} C(A1,…, An),  
or (2) if N{p} N*{p}, in addition {p} C(A*1,…, A*n) and { p} C(A*1,…, A*n), 
and also happens that - N{p} 1, 
then {p} C(A*1,…, A*n) and { p} C(A*1,…, A*n). 
 
Theorem 3.2. Let C be any universal JAC. C satisfies union-wise weak 
consistency,  
proposition-wise anonymity, set-wise systematicity, proposition-wise threshold 
need, 
and proposition-wise -positive responsiveness, iff C is the proposition-wise -
majority correspondence, that is, for any profile (A1,…, An) and any judgment set 
A X, A C(A1,…, An) iff NA . 
 
The proof of Theorem 3.2, very similar to that of Theorem 3.1, can be found in 
the Appendix.  
 
Notice that in contrast to what is usual under the separating JA approach, neither 
Theorem 3.1 nor Theorem 3.2 relies on the logical interconnections that may link 
the propositions in the agenda. They hold for any agenda. 
 
In fact, the pooling majority correspondence and any pooling special majority 
correspondence satisfy stronger properties such as union-wise weak consistency 
and set-wise anonymity. 
 
Set-wise anonymity. For any profiles (A1,…, An), (A*1,…, A*n) in the domain of C 
that are permutations of each other, C(A1,…, An)=C(A*1,…, A*n). 
 
Regarding responsiveness, the pooling majority correspondence and any pooling 
special majority satisfy the following condition: 
 
Set-wise non-negative responsiveness. For any judgment sets A X and any 
profiles (A1,…, An), (A*1,…, A*n) in the domain of C,  
if NA N*A and A C(A1,…, An), then A C(A*1,…, A*n).
11
 
 
In addition, the pooling majority correspondence satisfies the following condition 
of positive responsiveness: 
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 Set-wise non-negative responsiveness implies the following property: 
Set-wise monotonicity. For any judgment set A X, any i N and any two i-variants  
(A1,.., Ai ,.., An), (A1,.., A’i ,.., An) in the domain of C,  
if A Ai, A A’i and A C(A1,.., Ai ,.., An), then A C(A1,.., A’i,.., An), 
where two profiles (A1,.., Ai ,.., An), (A’1,.., A’i ,.., A’n) are i-variants of each other if, for any j≠i, 
Aj=A’j. 
 
16 
 
Set-wise majority positive responsiveness. C is set-wise majority positively 
responsive, iff for any judgment sets A X and any profiles (A1,…, An), (A*1,…, 
A*n) in the domain of C, if 1) NA N*A, and 2) (n+1)/2 , 
then  A C(A*1,…, A*n) and A’ C(A*1,…, A*n) for any A’ Q
A
 such that A’≠A. 
 
In turn, the pooling majority correspondence satisfies this one: 
 
Set-wise supermajority positive responsiveness. C is set-wise supermajority 
positively responsive, iff for any judgment sets A X and any profiles (A1,…, An), 
(A*1,…, A*n) in the domain of C, if 1) NA N*A; and 2) , 
then A C(A*1,…, A*n) and A’ C(A*1,…, A*n) for any A’ Q
A
 such that A’≠A. 
 
The conditions in Arrow’s theorem (unanimity, independence, and non-
dictatorship) are also known properties of majority voting and of any special 
majority rule. Set-wise independence has been introduced above. Let us adapt the 
other two properties to our framework. 
 
Set-wise unanimity. For any profile (A1,…, An) in the domain of C and any 
judgment set A X, if, for every individual i N, A Ai, then A C(A1,…, An). 
 
Non-set-wise dictatorship. There exists no j N such that for any profile  
(A1,…, An) in the domain of C, and any judgment set A X, if A Aj then 
A C(A1,…, An). 
 
At times in the literature on JA, this property is reinforced by the following one. 
 
Non-set-wise local dictatorship. There exists no i N and no judgment set A X 
such that for any profile (A1,…, An) in the domain of C,  
if A Ai then A C(A1,…, An). 
 
Notice that taking A=A*, set-wise systematicity implies set-wise independence. 
Similarly, it is apparent that set-wise anonymity implies non-set-wise dictatorship 
and non-set-wise local dictatorship.  
 
Translating Gibbard’s concept of an oligarchy, the following condition of non-
oligarchy can be proposed.
12
 It is apparent that this property is satisfied by the 
                                                 
12
 In the literature on JA another weaker concept of oligarchy is used (see, for instance, Dietrich 
and List 2008). In particular, the requirement that any oligarch has veto power has been 
eliminated. 
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pooling majority correspondence and by any pooling special majority 
correspondence except the unanimity correspondence. 
 
Non-set-wise oligarchy (in Gibbard’s sense). There is no non-empty group G N 
such that for any profile (A1,…, An) in the domain of C and any judgment set A,  
(a) if A , then A C(A1,…, An),  
and (b) for any i G,  if A’ Ai, then A” C(A1,…, An) for all A” Q
A
 such that 
A’ A”. 
 
Furthermore, adapting the third part of the proof of Theorem 1 in Dietrich and 
List (2007c: 28), it can be shown that any universal, set-wise independent and set-
wise monotonic JAC is non-set-wise manipulable, in the sense introduced by 
those authors. Adapting the notion of manipulability introduced by them, let us 
say that one judgment set A agrees with a set of judgment sets J on a judgment set 
A’ X, if (a) A’ A and A’ J, or (b) not A’ A, and A’ J; A disagrees with J on A 
otherwise.  
 
Correspondence C is set-wise manipulable at the profile (A1,.., Ai,.., An) by 
individual i on the judgment set A X (in Dietrich-List sense), 
if Ai disagrees with C(A1,.., Ai,.., An) on A,  
but Ai agrees with C(A1,.., A*i,.., An) on A for some i-variant (A1,.., A*i,.., An). 
 
Summing up. According to Theorems 3.1 and 3.2,  
any universal pooling JA correspondence C satisfies 
(1) union-wise weak consistency, 
(2) proposition-wise anonymity,  
(3) set-wise systematicity, 
and (4) proposition-wise positive responsiveness (proposition-wise threshold 
need, and proposition-wise -positive responsiveness), 
iff C is the pooling majority correspondence (C is the pooling -special majority), 
 
In addition, it should be noted that the pooling majority correspondence (any 
pooling -special majority correspondence) also satisfies: 
(1) union-wise and element-wise weak consistency, 
(2) element-wise strong consistency, 
(3) deductive closure, 
(3) set-wise anonymity, 
(5) set-wise majority positive responsiveness, set-wise non-negative 
responsiveness, and set-wise monotonicity (set-wise supermajority 
positive responsiveness, set-wise non-negative responsiveness, and set- 
wise monotonicity), 
(6) set-wise unanimity, 
(7) set-wise independence,  
(8) non-set-wise dictatorship and non-set-wise local dictatorship, 
and (9) non-set-wise manipulability or set-wise strategy-proofness. 
 
The pooling majority correspondence and any pooling -special majority 
correspondence with < N  satisfy also non-set-wise oligarchy (in Gibbard’s 
sense). 
 
 Gi iA
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This summary illustrates an especially relevant consequence of accepting element-
wise strong consistency as the main logical restriction on JACs. The pooling 
majority correspondence is the only JAC that, in addition to element-wise strong 
consistency and deductive closure, and except union-wise and element-wise 
completeness, satisfies all the properties that are usually presented as desirable 
conditions on the JA rules. Thus, this summary may explain why in practice the 
majority method is frequently used for aggregating judgments en bloc. In any 
case, Theorem 3.1, Theorem 3.2 and the above summary may provide the basis 
for a favorable assessment of the feasibility of the pooling majority and pooling 
special majority rules in contrast to those emerging from the separating JA 
approach.  
 
4   Demanding completeness 
In the preceding sections, completeness has been not required from the JA rules. 
Let us now address the case in which completeness is imposed on a JAC in 
addition to consistency.   
4.1 Completeness: a restrictive condition 
The pooling majority correspondence is neither contextually complete, nor 
element-wise complete, nor even union-wise complete. Thus, a new impossibility 
corollary may be derived from Theorem 3.1.   
 
Corollary 4.1.  
(a) There is no union-wise complete, union-wise weakly consistent JAC that 
satisfies proposition-wise anonymity, set-wise systematicity, and proposition-wise 
positive responsiveness. 
(b) If N  is odd, then there is no element-wise complete, union-wise weakly 
consistent JAC that satisfies proposition-wise anonymity, set-wise systematicity, 
and proposition-wise positive responsiveness. 
 
Requiring element-wise or contextual completeness from the separating majority 
correspondence may lack sense because C includes only singletons. Therefore, the 
relevant completeness condition in this case is union-wise completeness.  
 
By contrast, contextual and element-wise completeness are at least as relevant as 
union-wise completeness in the case of the pooling majority correspondence. 
Notice also that since the pooling majority and any special majority 
correspondences are lower deductively closed, they are contextually complete if 
and only if they are element-wise complete. 
 
It has been shown in Section 2 that the separating majority correspondence is 
union-wise complete if and only if the pooling majority correspondence is also 
union-wise complete. However, generating a element-wise complete collective 
outcome by the majority method in the pooling JA framework is a more difficult 
task than generating a union-wise complete collective outcome in the separating 
or in the pooling case, provided that there are in the agenda two or more 
propositions p and q such that p is neither equivalent to q nor to q.  
 
19 
Having an odd number of persons in the group is a sufficient condition for 
obtaining a union-wise complete collective set of judgment sets with the 
separating majority correspondence. This is because, in order to obtain the 
complete collective judgment set, it suffices that the group chooses one of the two 
propositions contained in each of the proposition-negation sets {p, p} X. By 
contrast, in the case of the pooling majority correspondence, that condition is no 
longer sufficient for element-wise completeness. Notice that if the agenda X 
contains two or more propositions p and q such that p is not equivalent either to q 
or to q, then Q
X
 contains more than two propositions. Let us compare, for 
instance, the agenda X’={p, p} with the agenda X”={p, p, q, q}, where p 
implies q but q does not imply p. Notice that X” is the slightest departure from X’. 
However, Q
X”
 contains three consistent judgment sets: {p, q}, {p, q}, and { p, 
q} while Q
X’
 contains only two: {p} and { p}. Obviously, as the number of non-
equivalent propositions in an agenda X increases, the number of consistent 
complete judgment sets also increases and, consequently, the probability of 
obtaining a complete collective output decreases.  
 
It should be noted, in addition, that for a class of JACs that contain the pooling 
majority correspondence and any pooling special majority correspondence, 
element-wise completeness implies element-wise full consistency for any profile 
of individual judgment sets.  
 
Theorem 4.1  Let C be any union-wise weakly consistent and lower deductively 
closed JAC, and let (A1,.., An) any profile of individual judgment sets. In addition, 
let C be such that for any A C(A1,.., An) there is an individual such that A Aj. 
(1) If C(A1,.., An) is element-wise complete, then it is element-wise strongly 
consistent. 
(2) Therefore, if C(A1,.., An) is element-wise complete and deductively closed, then 
it is element-wise fully consistent. 
 
Proof of Theorem 4.1. 
If C is element-wise complete, then there is a A C(A1,.., An) that is complete and 
such that for an individual A=Aj. Thus, A is element-wise fully consistent and, by 
union-wise weak consistency, is the only complete set in C(A1,.., An). Let Y be any 
sub-agenda. There is a judgment set A
’
 in Q
Y
 such that A
’
A. Therefore, A
’
 is 
strongly consistent. By lower deductive closure, A’ C(A1,.., An). By union-wise 
weak consistency, A’ is the only judgment set in QA’ C(A1,.., An). Hence,  
C(A1,.., An) is element-wise strongly consistent. 
QED.    
4.2 The pooling weak plurality correspondence 
While the compulsory strength of a general and unconditional requirement of 
completeness in JA procedures has become more dubious than before, a lack of 
completeness may cause serious problems in some situations where completeness 
may become highly desirable or even compelling. One feasible method for 
overcoming this flaw involves two features. On the one hand, the majority 
requirement is lowered, requiring only that the chosen judgment sets are 
supported by a subgroup at least as large as any other subgroup that supports any 
of the alternative judgment sets. On the other hand, a tie-breaking method is used 
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when necessary. Let us represent the aggregation stage of this procedure by the 
following JAC. 
 
The pooling weak plurality correspondence is the JAC that assigns to profile 
(A1,…, An) in the universal domain the following set of judgment sets  
SW(A1,…, An)={A X: NA NA’  for all A’ Q
A
}. 
 
It is true that no tie-breaking method is included in this JA rule. However, this rule 
only models the aggregation stage, like the other JACs that we have introduced in 
this paper. The tie-breaking method that we should add may be considered and 
analyzed as a part of the subsequent choice stage. 
 
The pooling weak plurality correspondence is element-wise complete at the 
expense of satisfying neither union-wise or union-wise weak consistency nor 
lower deductive closure. However, it always satisfies element-wise strong 
consistency. Notice in addition that like the pooling majority and special majority 
correspondences it satisfies set-wise anonymity. It is true that it does not satisfy 
set-wise systematicity or set-wise majority positive responsiveness. However, it 
can be characterized by the following weakened variants of these properties, 
jointly with element-wise completeness and set-wise anonymity.  
 
Contextual set-wise systematicity. For any profiles (A1,…, An), (A*1,…, A*n) in 
the domain, and any sub-agenda Y X, if there is a one-to-one mapping g of Q
Y 
onto itself such that NA=N*g(A), then, for all A Q
Y
, A C(A1,…, An) iff 
g(A) C(A*1,…, A*n). 
 
Contextual set-wise systematicity may be a more appealing property than set-wise 
systematicity for some aggregation problems. For instance, it is satisfied by a 
common parliamentary practice that violates set-wise systematicity. In such cases, 
higher acceptance thresholds of votes are required on certain issues that are 
considered more important than others.  
 
Given a profile (A1,…, An) and a judgment set, let k=Given a profile (A1,…, An) 
and a judgment set, let k=  
 
Set-wise weak plurality positive responsiveness.  
C is set-wise weak plurality positively responsive, iff 
for any judgment sets A X and any profiles (A1,…, An), (A*1,…, A*n) in the 
domain of C, if 1) NA N*A; 2) for any A’ Q
A
 such that A’≠A, NA’ N*A’ , then  
(a) if ( N*A - NA ) k, then A C(A*1,…, A*n),  
and (b) if A C(A1,…, An) or ( NA* - NA )>k, then A C(A*1,…, A*n) and 
A” C(A*1,…,A*n) for any A” Q
A
 such that A”≠A. 
 
Since the proof of the following theorem is very similar to that of Theorem 3.1, it 
is included in the Appendix. 
  
Theorem 4.2  Any universal C satisfies contextual completeness, set-wise 
anonymity, contextual systematicity, and set-wise weak plurality positive 
responsiveness, 
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iff , C is the pooling weak plurality correspondence, that is, for any profile (A1,…, 
An) and any judgment set A X, A C(A1,…, An) iff NA NA’  for all A’ Q
A’
. 
 
Given that pooling weak plurality does not satisfy union-wise weak consistency, 
the following corollary follows from Theorem 4.2. 
 
Corollary 4.2. There is no universal JAC that satisfies contextual completeness, 
union-wise weak consistency, set-wise anonymity, contextual set-wise 
systematicity, and set-wise weak plurality positive responsiveness. 
 
As far as the conditions required in Arrow’s theorem are concerned, pooling weak 
plurality satisfies set-wise unanimity; since it is set-wise anonymous it is not set-
wise dictatorial, not set-wise locally dictatorial, and not set-wise oligarchical; in 
addition, contextual set-wise systematicity implies contextual set-wise 
independence. 
 
Contextual set-wise independence. For any sub-agenda Y X, if NA=N*A for any 
judgment set A Q
Y
, then for any A’ QY, A’ C(A1,…, An) iff A’ C(A*1,…, A*n). 
 
Another two nice properties of the pooling weak plurality are the following. 
 
Efficiency. A JA correspondence C is efficient iff for any profile (A1,.., An) in its 
domain and any sub-agenda Y, Q
Y
C(A1,.., An)≠ . 
 
Minimal efficiency. A JA correspondence C is minimally efficient iff for any 
profile (A1,.., An) in its domain, C(A1,.., An)≠ . 
 
Obviously, any efficient JAC is minimally efficient. Notice, in addition, that the 
pooling and the separating majority correspondences, as well as the pooling and 
separating special majority correspondences are not minimally efficient. If N  is 
odd, then the pooling and the separating majority correspondences are minimally 
efficient but not necessarily efficient. On the other hand, for any pooling JA 
correspondence C, 1) if C is union-wise complete, then it is minimally efficient, 
and 2) C is efficient iff it is element-wise complete. 
 
However, plurality achieves element-wise completeness at the cost of violating 
the following property. 
 
Non-majority rejection.  A JA correspondence C satisfies this property if, for any 
profile (A1,.., An) in its domain and any judgment set A C(A1,.., An) there is no 
majority that rejects A, that is, there is no group G N, such that 1) 
G (n+1)/2 , and 2) for any person j G, A Aj is logically inconsistent. 
 
For some JA problems, such as the passage of a law in parliament, this condition 
may not be relevant. But in cases such as those illustrated by the Politeia 
association example, it seems clearly plausible. 
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4.3 The pooling plurality correspondence 
We can also define the binary relation ‘as least as efficient as’ between pooling 
and separating JACs in the following way. The JA aggregation correspondence C 
is as least as efficient as the JA aggregation correspondence C’ iff  
(a) The domain of C’ is a (non-necessary proper) subset of the domain of C; 
(b) for any profile (A1,…, An) in the domain of C, any sub-agenda Y X,  
if Q
Y
C’(A1,.., An)≠ , then Q
Y
C(A1,.., An)≠ . 
 
As usual, we say that the JA correspondence C is more efficient than the JA 
correspondence C’, iff C is as least as efficient as C’ but C’ is not as least as 
efficient as C; and C is equally efficient as C’, iff C is as least as efficient as C’ 
and C’ is as least as efficient as C. 
 
Let say, in addition, that the JA correspondence C is an extension of the JA 
correspondence C’ if, for any sub-agenda Y X, such that  
Q
Y
C’(A1,.., An)≠ , it happens that C(A1,.., An)= C’(A1,.., An).  
 
Notice that if N >5, (1) the pooling majority correspondence is an extension of 
any pooling majority correspondence and is more efficient than it; (2) the pooling 
plurality correspondence is an extension of the pooling majority correspondence 
and is more efficient than it; and analogously, (3) the pooling weak plurality 
correspondence is a more efficient extension of the pooling plurality 
correspondence. 
 
The pooling weak plurality correspondence is element-wise complete, but it is not 
union-wise weakly consistent. However, it may be the case that gaining 
completeness at the expense of weak consistency is considered unnecessary. So, 
the pooling plurality correspondence, which is more efficient than the pooling 
majority correspondence may be sometimes considered a suitable option.  
 
Obviously, the pooling plurality correspondence satisfies the following condition. 
 
Contextual semi-completeness.  
For any profile (A1,…, An) in the universal domain, and any sub-agenda Y X, 
if there is a judgment set A Q
Y
 such that NA > NA’ for any A’ Q
Y
, then there is 
a judgment set A” QY such that A” C(A1,…, An). 
 
Consider also the following variant of positive responsiveness. 
 
Set-wise plurality positive responsiveness.  
C is set-wise plurality positively responsive, iff 
for any judgment sets A X and any profiles (A1,…, An), (A*1,…, A*n) in the 
domain of C, if 1) NA N*A; and 2) for any A’ Q
A
 such that A’≠A, NA’ N*A’ , 
then,  
if ( N*A - NA )>k or A C(A1,…, An), then A C(A*1,…, A*n) and A” C(A*1,…, 
A*n) for any A” Q
A
 such that A”≠A, where k=  
 for any A” QA such that A”≠A, where k= 
It turns out that substituting contextual semi-completeness for contextual 
completeness, substituting set-wise plurality positive responsiveness for set-wise 
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weak plurality positive responsiveness, and adding union-wise weak consistency, 
the following characterization of the pooling plurality rule can be obtained. 
 
Theorem 4.3. For any universal C, C satisfies contextual semi-completeness, 
union-wise weak consistency, set-wise anonymity, contextual systematicity and 
set-wise plurality positive responsiveness, iff C is the pooling plurality 
correspondence. 
 
The proof of Theorem 4.3 is entirely analogous to that of Theorem 4.2. It is 
therefore included in the Appendix. 
 
The following is a straightforward corollary of Theorem 4.3. 
 
Corollary 4.3. There is no universal JAC that satisfies contextual completeness, 
union-wise weak consistency, set-wise anonymity, contextual set-wise 
systematicity, and set-wise plurality positive responsiveness. 
 
Let us conclude this section summarizing the properties of the pooling weak 
plurality and of the pooling plurality correspondences. 
 
Theorems 4.2 and 4.3 state that any universal pooling JA correspondence satisfies 
(1) contextual completeness (contextual semi-completeness and union-wise weak 
 consistency),  
(2) set-wise anonymity,  
(3) contextual systematicity, 
(4) and set-wise weak-plurality positive responsiveness (set-wise plurality positive 
 responsiveness), 
iff C is the pooling weak plurality (the pooling plurality) correspondence. 
 
In addition, the pooling weak plurality (the pooling plurality) correspondence also 
satisfies: 
(1) element-wise strong consistency, 
(2) set-wise unanimity, 
(3) contextual set-wise independence,  
(4) non-set-wise dictatorship, non-set-wise local dictatorship and  
non-set-wise oligarchy, 
and (5) efficiency (not-minimal efficiency). 
 
5   Concluding remarks  
The pooling JA approach ensures the element-wise full consistency for a large 
class of JA procedures, namely, all those correspondences such that if  
A C(A1,.., An), then A Aj for some individual j N. In particular, (universal) 
pooling majority and (universal) pooling special majority rules are element-wise 
fully consistent. In addition, I have argued that element-wise full consistency is 
more binding for JACs than union-wise full consistency.  
 
Further, (universal) pooling majority voting is the only (universal) pooling JA 
method that satisfies a large and known set of generally desirable properties on 
the aggregation process, likewise each (universal) pooling special majority rule is 
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the only (universal) pooling JA method that satisfies another different but similar 
set of relevant properties. Therefore, in this paper I have maintained that the 
(universal) pooling special majority rules and especially the (universal) pooling 
majority rule may be considered as salient and feasible pooling JA procedures, in 
contrast to the unfavorable assessment of (universal) separating majority and of 
(universal) separating special majority rules. I have also claimed that the analysis 
of pooling majority voting carried out in Sections 2 and 3 can help to explain the 
common practice of aggregating individual judgments en bloc by majority voting. 
 
Pooling majority and special majority rules sacrifice completeness in order to 
satisfy a large number of desirable properties. While completeness is no longer 
universally recognized as an unconditionally binding requirement on JA 
procedures in all situations, it is nevertheless a desirable property and may be a 
compelling requirement to address some JA problems. Thus, in Section 4, I 
described a fully complete (universal) pooling JA method, namely (universal) 
pooling weak plurality correspondence. While JAC does not satisfy some 
consistency conditions such as union-wise weak consistency and deductive 
closure, it is element-wise strongly consistent. Thus, it satisfies the basic 
consistency requirement. In addition, it is upper deductively closed, and if a tie-
breaking procedure is used, the collective output would be union-wise weakly 
consistent. It is true that the pooling weak plurality correspondence does not 
satisfy some other properties of majority voting, such as set-wise systematicity 
and set-wise majority positive responsiveness. However, it satisfies weakened 
versions thereof. It has also been shown that the (universal) pooling weak 
plurality correspondence is the only (universal) element-wise complete and 
element-wise strongly consistent JAC that satisfies set-wise anonymity and 
weakened versions of set-wise systematicity and set-wise majority positive 
responsiveness.  
 
Similarly, the (universal) pooling plurality correspondence is the only (universal) 
union-wise weakly consistent, element-wise strongly consistent, and upper 
deductively closed JAC that satisfies set-wise anonymity, a weakened version of 
set-wise systematicity, set-wise plurality positive responsiveness, and in addition, 
a weakened version of completeness. Thus, as in the case of majority and special 
majority correspondences, the assessment of (universal) weak plurality and 
(universal) plurality stemming from the pooling approach should be more 
favorable than that of their separating variants. 
 
However, weak plurality and plurality are less satisfactory methods of aggregation 
than majority and special majorities. Among other considerations, they do not 
satisfy the non-majority rejection condition. Thus, in such JA aggregation 
problems in which completeness is highly desirable or not at all expendable, the 
pooling approach may not be of great help. It should be noted, however, that the 
separating approach may not be any more helpful. Since the agenda X contains 
two or more propositions p and q such that p is not equivalent to q and is also not 
equivalent to q, the pooling majority correspondence, the pooling -special 
majority correspondence, the pooling plurality correspondence, and the pooling 
weak plurality correspondence are each a more efficient extension of the 
corresponding separating variant. 
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A Appendix: Additional proofs. 
Proof of Theorem 3.2.  
Like with Theorem 3.1, we focus on the ‘if, then’ part. Notice, in addition, that by 
universality and set-wise systematicity, the statement ‘for any profile (A1,…, An) 
and any proposition p, {p} C(A1,…, An) iff N{p} > (n+1)/2 ’ implies that for 
any profile (A1,…, An) and any judgment set A X, A C(A1,…, An) iff NA > 
> (n+1)/2 . Therefore, in order to prove the theorem it suffices to prove that for 
any profile (A1,…,An) and any proposition p, {p} C(A1,…, An) iff N{p} > 
> (n+1)/2 . This is done in Claim 5. 
 
Claim 1. If N{p} <  and N{ p} < , then {p} C(A1,…, An) and  
{ p} C(A1,…, An). 
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Proof of Claim 1. Suppose for a proof by contradiction that {p} C(A1,…, An) or 
{ p} C(A1,…, An). Proposition-wise threshold need implies that N{p}  
or N{ p} , contradicting the assumption. QED. 
 
Claim 2. If N{p} , then {p} C(A1,…, An). 
Proof of Claim 2. Take from the universal domain a profile (A’1,…, A’n) such that  
N’{p}  N{p}, N{ p} N’{ p }, and - N’{p} =1. Then N’{p} < , and N’{ p} < . By 
Claim 1, {p} C(A’1,…, A’n) and { p} C(A’1,…, A’n). But then, proposition-wise 
-positive responsiveness implies that {p} C(A1,…, An). QED. 
 
Claim 3. If N{ p} N - , then { p} C(A1,…, An). 
Proof of Claim 3. Assume that N{ p} N -  and { p} C(A1,…, An) for a proof 
by contradiction. Since > (n+1)/2 , then N{p} , and N{p} > N{ p } . Take 
from the universal domain a profile (A’1,…, A’n) such that N{p}=N’{ p } and  
N{ p }=N’{p}. Notice that by set-wise systematicy, {p}  C(A’1,…, A’n). Take now 
another profile (A”1,.., A”n) from the universal domain such that N”{p} = N’{p} , 
N”{p}  N{p}, N{ p } N”{ p }. Notice that the profile (A”1,…, A”n) is a permutation 
of the profile (A’1,…, A’n). Therefore, by anonymity {p} C(A”1,…, A”n). Then, 
given that N”{p}  N{p}, proposition-wise positive responsiveness implies that 
{p} C(A1,…, An) and { p} C(A1,…, An), contradicting the assumption that 
{ p} C(A1,…, An). QED. 
 
Claim 4. If {p} C(A1,…, An) and { p} C(A1,…, An), then N{p}  
(and N{ p} < .)  
Proof of Claim 4. By Claims 2 and 3, if N{ p} , then { p} C(A1,…, An) and 
{p} C(A1,…, An). Since {p} C(A1,…, An) and { p} C(A1,…, An), then 
N{ p} < . Suppose that N{p} < . Then by Claim 1, { p} C(A1,…, An) and 
{p} C(A1,…, An). Hence, since {p} C(A1,…, An) and { p} C(A1,…, An), then 
N{p} . QED. 
 
Claim 5. For any profile (A1,…, An) and any proposition p, {p} C(A1,…, An) iff 
N{p} . 
Proof of Claim 5. By proposition-wise weak consistency and Claim 4,  
if {p} C(A1,.., An), then N{p} . On the other hand, by Claim 3, if N{p}  
then {p} C(A1,…, An). QED. 
 
 
Proof of Theorem 4.2.  
As in former cases, let us focus on the ‘if, then’ part. In addition, given a profile 
(A1,..,An) and a pair of judgment sets A, A* Q
A
, let (A’1,.., A’n) be any profile such 
that NA=N’A*, N’A=NA*, and for the remaining judgment sets A’ in Q
A
, NA’ =N’A’. 
 
Claim 1. If NA = NA*  and A* C(A1,.., An), then A C(A1,.., An). 
Proof of Claim 1. Assume to the contrary that NA = NA* , A* C(A1,.., An) and 
A C(A1,.., An). Notice that in this case (A’1,.., A’n) is a permutation of (A1,.., An). 
By anonymity, A* C(A’1,.., A’n)  and A C(A’1,.., A’n). But, in contradiction, 
contextual systematicity implies that A* C(A’1,.., A’n) and A C(A’1,.., A’n). 
Hence, if NA = NA* and A* C(A1,.., An), then A C(A1,.., An). QED. 
Claim 2. If NA > NA*  and A* C(A1,.., An), then A C(A1,.., An). 
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Proof of Claim 2. Assume now that NA > NA* , A* C(A1,.., An) and   
A C(A1,.., An). By contextual systematicity, A C(A’1,.., A’n) and  
A* C(A’1,.., A’n). Let (A”1,.., A”n) be another profile such that (1) 
N”A* = N’A* = NA  and N”A = N’A = NA* ,  
(2) NA*  N”A*; (3) N”A  NA; (4)  N”A* N”A =NA*  NA; and (5) for the remaining 
judgment sets A” QA, NA”=N”A”. Notice that (A”1,.., A”n) is a permutation f of     
(A’1,.., A’n) such that for any individual i, A’i= A”f(i). Since A C(A’1,.., A’n) and 
A* C(A’1,.., A’n), anonymity implies that A C(A”1,.., A”n) and  
A* C(A”1,.., A”n). But then, since 1) N”A NA and, in addition, 2) N”A* > NA*  
and N”A”= NA” for any judgment set in Q
A
 such that A”≠A and A”≠A*, then set-
wise weak plurality positive responsiveness implies that A C(A1,.., An), in 
contradiction to the above assumption that A* C(A1,.., An) and A C(A1,.., An). 
QED. 
 
Claim 3. If NA > NA* , then A* C(A1,.., An). 
Proof of Claim 3. Let us suppose that NA > NA*  and A* C(A1,.., An). By Claim 
2, A C(A’1,.., A’n). However, since A* C(A1,.., An), the set-wise weak plurality 
positive responsiveness implies then that A C(A’1,.., A’n). Contradiction. 
Therefore, if NA > NA* , then A* C(A1,.., An). QED. 
 
Claim 4. If NA NA’ for all A’ Q
A
, then A C(A1,.., An). 
Proof of Claim 4. Assume that NA NA’ for all A’ Q
A
. Since C is contextually 
complete, there is some A” QA C(A1,.., An). But then Claims 1 and 2 imply that 
A C(A1,.., An). Hence, if NA NA’ for all A’ Q
A
, then A C(A1,.., An). Suppose 
now that A C(A1,.., An) and, by contradiction, suppose that NA’ > NA for some 
A’ QA. Claim 3 implies that A C(A1,.., An). Contradiction. Then,  
if A C(A1,.., An), then NA NA’ for all A’ Q
A
. QED. 
 
Proof of Theorem 4.3. For the same reason as with the former characterization 
theorems, we need to prove only the ‘if, then’ part. Given a profile (A1,.., An) and 
a pair of judgment sets A, A* Q
A
, let (A’1,.., A’n) be any profile such that 
NA=N’A*, N’A=NA*, and for the remaining judgment sets A’ in Q
A
, NA’ =N’A’. 
 
Claim 1. If NA = NA*  and A* C(A1,.., An), then A C(A1,.., An). 
Proof of Claim 1. (See the proof of Claim 1 in the proof of Theorem 4.2). 
 
Claim 2. If NA > NA*  and A* C(A1,.., An), then A C(A1,.., An). 
Claim 3. If NA > NA* , then A* C(A1,.., An). 
Proof of Claims 2 and 3. (Like the proofs of Claims 2 and 3 in the proof of 
Theorem 4.2, substituting set-wise plurality positive responsiveness for set-wise 
weak plurality positive responsiveness). 
 
Claim 4. If NA > NA’ for all A’ Q
A
, then A C(A1,.., An).  
Proof of Claim 1. Assume that NA > NA’ for all A’ Q
A
 and A C(A1,.., An). 
Since C is contextually semi-complete, there is an A” QA such that  
A” C(A1,.., An). If A”≠A, then NA > NA” , so A” C(A1,.., An) by Claim 3. 
Contradiction. QED. 
 
Claim 5. If A C(A1,.., An) then NA > NA’ for all A’ Q
A
. 
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Proof of Claim 2. Suppose A C(A1,.., An), and by contradiction suppose 
NA’ NA  for some A’ Q
A
. Then Claims 1 and 2 say A’ C(A1,.., An) also. But 
this contradicts union-wise weak consistency. QED. 
 
 
